Showing posts with label Abu Dhabi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abu Dhabi. Show all posts

Monday 11 October 2010

SICO Bahrain: Dubai Debt Problems Just Deferred Until 2014?


SICO Bahrain has issued a new report, "Dubai Debt Concerns Deferred to 2014".  SICO Research is only available to registered users so you'll have to sign up to read the report in detail.

Here are some highlights.  Themes that might already be familiar and some not.
  1. Forgetfulness of investors in limelight.  Some history on the trends in CDS spread differentials between Dubai and Abu Dhabi (180 bps in October 2009 to 480 bps in early December and then again to similar levels around the Greek crisis).
  2. Recent US$1.25 billion issue not sufficient to plug the 2010 deficit (estimated at US$1.6 billion).  Plans to slash subsidies and other transfers by 64%, though wages to increase by nearly 20% as the Government needs to make room for more nationals entering the workforce.
  3. Repayment schedule remains a challenge.  SICO estimates very modest debt repayments in 2011 and 2012.  For the period 2013 - 2015 excluding bilateral, the estimates are US$1.7 billion in 2013,   US$19.23 billion in 2014 and US$0.5 billion in 2015.   So a definite debt hump in 2014 - and the reason for the title to SICO's article.
  4. Economic recovery may not improve Government revenues.  Trade and tourism not expected to generate significant large government revenues.
  5. Not many options to improve finances.  Taxes a possibility but pose competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other GCC states.
  6. Sale of assets a possibility.  SICO believes the Government may take the strategy of selling partial stakes to raise cash rather than relinquish control of strategic assets.
  7. Dubai increasingly "leveraging" the UAE brand.  Apparently in the prospectus for the recent bond, a great deal was made of the fact that the UAE has a AA sovereign rating.  SICO sees this as a way of diverting attention from Dubai's 395 bps CDS roughly 296 bps higher than Abu Dhabi.  In my opinion it may also be a way of reminding investors of Abu Dhabi's deep pockets.
  8. Despite the negatives, SICO does not believe a sovereign default is likely.  It seems to me that the major issue here is one of pricing of credit as well as lenders and investors being careful about the quantum they commit to the Emirate.

Saturday 9 October 2010

Department of Sycophancy: "Sheikh Mansour Emerges as the Arabian Warrent Buffet"

الشيج واران بوفيت منصور

So we're told by Arabian Business.

When I think of Warren Buffet I think of many things:
  1. A determination to succeed and lots of hard work.  Warren began his career delivering newspapers from his bicycle (which he duly depreciated on his tax return!).
  2. A ferocious pursuit of deals, many originating from "cold calls" on firms.
  3. A generally single-minded focus on a particular investment philosophy (value investing as taught by Benjamin Graham).  
  4. A cool rational head not swayed by whatever was the then current irrational exuberance.
  5. A painstaking building of a fortune.  Earning money, saving, reinvesting, making a profit, and repeating the cycle
  6. Many highly profitable and visible deals.
  7. Despite all of this, little affect on his ego or lifestyle.  He lives in the same rather modest house in Omaha that he bought long ago.
Arabian Business is silent on all but the sixth point so we can only imagine how the other six apply to the Sheikh.

What we do learn from the article apropos of the sixth point is that:
  1. He owns Manchester City Football Club.  How this came about and how it was funded are presumably too well known to require recounting, which is perhaps sad because we are left not knowing how he displayed his legendary skill in closing this transaction.  Did he begin with a paper route for The National or perhaps more likely Akhbar Al Arab?  Save his first earnings and by repeating the cycle amassed the GBP 300 million to buy the Club?
  2. "He" made an investment in Barclays in the dark days of 2008 and has now made US$3 billion on an "exit".   One that we learn that leaves "the sheikh exposed to any upside in the share price and completely protects him from any downside."  
The latter deal sounds almost miraculous.  He exited Barclays yet retains upside in the shares.

So how can we understand Arabian Business's statement: he "completed his exit from this cool investment"?    Frank Kane has an account here.  As the words suggest, risk has been hedged but not eliminated.

First, PCP3, not the Sheikh,  will continue to own the shares.  PCP 3 has entered into a derivatives transaction with Nomura.  In effect risk on Nomura has been substituted for Barclays.

And as always with derivative transactions the devil is in the details.  What are the conditions for exercise?  Any restrictions or limits on the number of shares to be "put" at any one time?  What is the strike price (or its equivalent) on the transaction?  Current market price?  Something lower?  Is there a time limit at which point the (derivative) contract expires and Nomura is no longer obligated?   Will PCP3 need to roll the derivative forward to maintain its protection at that future date at a price to be determined?    And perhaps very importantly what did the derivative cost?  Are there future costs associated with it?   One presumes Nomura priced for the risk they're taking considering both price and time.  So this isn't a costless transaction.  But then PCP3 gets to keep the upside.

Still a remarkable return.  One worthy of much praise.  Especially when one considers such debacles  as one SWF's investment in Citibank convertible securities.

But before Arabian Business rushes to describe the Sheikh as the Arabian Warren Buffet, it may be appropriate to wait for the development of a consistent track record.  

Not so long ago, Maha AlGhunaim, Esam Janahi and others were lauded for their investment prowess.  And like many a legend, time has not been kind to these.

Tuesday 5 October 2010

TAQA: US$3.1 Billion Facility Rollover Discussion in Early Stage


Here's TAQA's announcement on the ADX today confirming that it is in the early stages of negotiations to rollover its US$3.1 billion facility maturing next August. 

The press release notes that only US$1 billion has been drawn and that the facility was extended by a 14 member banking syndicate composed of local and international banks.

Thursday 16 September 2010

Dubai: More Pain to Come


Tom Arnold over at The National has an article on the pain likely to come from Nakheel and Dubai Holding restructurings.

As well as a few quotes from the ratings downgrade of ADCB.  Sounds like Brother Eiraqat already needs more than two 1000 mg Dolgit.

Friday 13 August 2010

You Said What?: Tomalin Reveals Why There Will Always Be Banking Crisis


Taking a leaf from Charlie Prince's notebook, Michael Tomalin, CEO, of NBAD revealed why there will always be bad loans and banking crises in this article from The National:
“The problem if every bank is name lending and you are not is that it puts you in an awkward position,” Mr Tomalin said.
Dance to the music.  And pay the piper later.

Or perhaps, "But, Mom, all the kids were doing it".

Thursday 5 August 2010

Aldar Properties - S&P Lowers Rating to "Junk"

S&P has lowered Aldar's ratings to BB- from A-.   That's a more than one step change! Outlook is negative.  So S&P's message is a significant negative.
"We understand that despite relatively sound overall supply demand fundamentals in the Abu Dhabi property  market," added Mr. Trask, "Aldar has been significantly affected by spill-over effects from the heavily oversupplied Dubai real estate market, characterized by significant declines in rental and market values."

This is having a negative effect on both the demand for, and the price achieved by, Aldar for the sale of real estate in Abu Dhabi.  Based on the pipeline of new supply both in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, we do not anticipate a reversal of this situation anytime soon. 
Two items worthy of comment:
  1. The last sentence "We do not anticipate a reversal of this situation anytime soon."   S&P's ratings action also reflected a revision of their assumption re likely government support.
  2. Ascription of Aldar's problems to the "spillover" from Dubai.
 On the negative outlook.
We are also assigning a negative outlook, which reflects our view regarding Aldar's future  profitability and cash flow generation in light of the challenging market conditions.

Sunday 1 August 2010

Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank - AED 306 Million Loss for 1H10


By now you've probably seen the press articles on ADCB's 1H10 results and perhaps as well it's press release and the financials themselves.  The loss was due to the Bank taking an AED1.035 billion provision for its AED6.6 exposure to Dubai World. 

Here are some points that caught my eye.

First, the Financials.
  1. Customer Deposits have grown from AED86.3 billion at 31 December 2009 to AED96.8 billion at 30 June 2010.  AED90.1 billion at 31 March 2010.  Unfortunately, there's no note for Customer Deposits so it's not possible to see where the increase primarily came from - government, corporate or retail clients.   Anyone out there with any information, please post.  As well, if  anyone knows, if ADCB is paying above market for funds.
  2. Note 2: Bank Deposits - While there is a non trivial AED1.0 billion decrease, the major story here is the shift.  Deposits with banks in the UAE is now 44% versus 33% at 31 December 2009.   A greater proportion of AED deposits?  Helping provide FX funding in the local market.  BTW you'll note that balances with the UAE Central Bank increased by AED700 million roughly the decline in interbanks.
  3. Note11:  Interest receivable has increased roughly AED230 million (of which AED147 million was in 1Q10) to AED837 million - some 37.8% over Fiscal Year End 2009's AED607 million.  Looking at Note 14, you'll notice that Interest Payable actually declined 4.0% to AED952 million from AED992 million at FYE09.   Unclear if this is timing differences.  Longer interest periods on loans than the deposits funding them.  Or a sign of some distress.  Something to keep an eye on.
Second, Press Release.
  1. Loan to Deposits Ratio.   Yes, the ratio has come down from 135% to 123%.  You'll note it was 151% (! ?) in March 2009.  That's the right trend.  But, sorry to be impolite but a loan to deposits ratio over 100% is not sound banking practice.  In fact it should be lower.
  2. "We have taken a more disciplined approach to pricing risk and have significantly enhanced our capabilities in risk management and strengthened controls across the business. As a result of the current economic environment, both corporate and consumer segments continue to experience high levels of stress and therefore we have had to take significant impairments in the first half of 2010.”  And would seem to have some more miles to go.  To be fair it does take time to turn around a big ship.  And changing a corporate culture perhaps even longer.
  3. Dubai World Provision - I had understood that the Central Bank of the UAE had asked banks to refrain from provisioning until the restructuring was finalized and they had a chance to study the implications.  Is ADCB pulling a Citibank here?  If you know your banking history (and who doesn't devote lots of time to that interesting topic?),  that question will remind you of the action taken by Citibank to provision for duff sovereign loans in the 1980's.  In effect setting a "standard" for other US banks all of whom (including Citi) had heretofore been pretending that those loans - particularly those to Latin borrowers - were "as good as gold".  Is ADCB getting out in front of the pack so that when other lenders do take the provisions, that Quarter ADCB will be able to report a profit amid a sea of red ink at its competitors?  Or does it have more major pain of its own to take and is trying to spread it out in more manageable chunks?
  4. Non Performing Loans:  Increased some AED491 million and the NPL ratio (NPLs to Total Loans) from 5.2% at FYE 09 to 5.4% at 1H10.  That looks good until one notices that the Total Loan portfolio has increased from AED116.6 to AED118.8 billion.  Hopefully, we can assume that none of that AED2.2 billion increase has gone bad yet.  Using total loans at FYE09,  the NPL ratio is 5.8%.  That I think is fairer measure.  
  5. Provision Coverage:  ADCB's press release notes that its Provisions to NPLs ratio is 76.7% as of 1H10 versus 67.8% as of FYE09.  That looks good until one notices that the AED1.035 billion provision for Dubai World in included in the Provision total but none of the DW exposure as NPLs.  The latter presumably because DW is not past due on payment.  If we strip the DW provision out, ADCB's Provision Coverage is 61.3% a decrease from FYE09.  It's hard to understand the logic behind ADCB's calculation unless of course it considers the DW exposure "as good as gold".
  6. Collateral:  AED2.8 billion at 1H10 versus AED5.5 billion at FYE09.  No explanation for the 50.9% decline.  Valuation changes?  Realisation of collateral to repay loans?  Clients repaid and collateral was returned to them?  All bits of information that would help assess the credit health of ADCB.  The note does mention that much of the collateral for NPLs is real property.  Is that the hint to the reason - further mark downs of property?
As indicated above, some trends to watch on the credit front, though the Bank's main shareholder has supported ADCB from its birth to today whenever it needed funds.  And has the resources to do so again. 

Wednesday 28 July 2010

Further Pressure on Rental Rates in Dubai

Gulf News has an article about continuing declines in the Dubai residential and commercial real estate market.  And how this is causing an influx from other Emirates where the supply of "affordable" housing is currently constrained.

New supply is anticipated to exacerbate conditions.

Two sentences in the article caught my eye:
The main concentration of upcoming office supply will come from the Business Bay development. However this is expected to happen in 2011. "There are various infrastructure issues with a lot of completed towers sitting there," said Green.
Perhaps, The Real Nick can comment on what these are.   Utilities, especially electricity?  Or transport.  And of course any reader with a comment is encouraged to weigh in with a comment.   In general the more informative bits of info on this blog come from reader comments.

Continued weakness in real estate suggests issues for lenders on their existing portfolios.  And for developers fewer new projects and perhaps some customers' walking away from previous commitments - as lower rent rates imply a lower value of properties.

There's more to come on this topic.  CB Richard Ellis 2Q report on Dubai should be available on their website shortly.  When it is, I'll post again with the link.

Tuesday 27 July 2010

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - Fortis Bank v ADIB - Fortis Drops "Structured" Bombshell

 
 Warning:  Ethics Depicted in Picture May be Smaller Than They Appear

In  my earlier post analyzing the Awal Bank L/C I spent a bit of time speculating on the transaction as a disguised money on money loan and the potential role of Bunge in the second leg, the purchase on a spot basis of the commodity back from from AlGosaibi/Awal Bank.  The necessary step to get funds to AlGosaibi for the loan.

As they say (and they are right), reading is fundamental.   I could have saved a bit of time by looking a bit closer at two documents I had printed out.  

Today having posted on the BNPP lawsuit against ADIB, I decided to finish off the ADIB topic by commenting on the two latest submissions by ADIB and Fortis' counsel in the Fortis Case (NY Supreme Court Reference #601948/2009) - Documents #78 and #79.   Documents I had printed out on 9 July!

Right there on the first page of the 9 June 2010 letter from George O. Richardson, III, Esq.  of Sullivan & Worcester, Fortis' counsel, was the revelation that Bunge had informed ADIB of the precise nature of the transaction via an email prior dated 7 April 2008 - that is, prior to the date  ADIB agreed to confirm Awal Bank's letter of credit.  ADIB's SWIFT confirmation to Fortis was sent 16 June 2008  as per Document #24 Exhibit #2.  Some two or so months later.   By the way, that document (not the Bunge 7 April email but the copy of  SWIFT confirmation of the LC) was submitted by ADIB as part of Nuhad Saliba's Declaration.  Ms. Saliba is Head of the New Countries and Global Wholesale Banking Department at ADIB.

The Bunge email was sent by Rachel Wong of Bunge SA Geneva to Naeem Ishaque, Manager Financial Institutions at ADIB.  There are a variety of copy parties but their affiliations are not clear from the message.  The email is Exhibit #1 to Exhibit A in the Richardson Letter (Document #79).

So what did the Bunge email say?
"Section 15. Structure  This is a structured transaction whereby Discounting Bank [AA:  Fortis though at this point Fortis name is not mentioned, perhaps because Bunge was still shopping the second confirmation] is required to discount or fund the Instrument in favor of the Beneficiary once the documents are deemed in compliance at its counter, Applicant [AA:  AlGosaibi Trading] will on-sell the Goods to another Bunge affiliated company ("Bunge Buyer").  Once Beneficiary receives the discounted proceeds under the Instrument, Bunge Buyer will effect sight payment to the Applicant immediately.  Applicant will enjoy the cash financing during the Tenor [AA:  the 360 days from acceptance of documents until payment] before repaying the Issuing Bank [AA:  Awal Bank] on maturity of the Instrument."
This effectively demolishes ADIB's argument that it thought this was a trade transaction and that somehow it was tricked and so inadvertently and innocently defrauded.   ADIB is clearly an active and knowing participant in the transaction which equally clearly is a "money on money" loan.  Some might say that transactions like this are  a fraud against the Shari'ah. (With respect to AA's position please see the last sentence).

It also raises a very fundamental question about ADIB's earlier legal arguments in which it and its counsel claim that the bank did not see this was a structured transaction and had no inkling that it was participating in a money on money financing.   

ADIB's learned counsel at Dewey & LeBoeuf have set a high standard of knowledge in their previous pleadings.  They asserted that because Fortis Singapore advised a L/C for the same goods and in fact the same documents, Fortis Netherlands - half way across the world - was deemed to know this with respect to the Awal LC  it confirmed. 

Therefore, it seems highly appropriate and fair to apply D&LB's standard to ADIB with even more rigor because ADIB operates from a single country.  Thus with the greater proximity one would no doubt expect that the knowledge at ADIB permeated every level of that firm, including the chap who makes the tea.

Some might also be tempted to remark that there is a repetitive pattern here with "Islamic" banks of much less than كلام شريف  in their legal pleadings as in the case of TID v BLOM.

Heeding the admonition of Imam AlGhazali, AA will remain silent on all these points.

Monday 26 July 2010

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - BNPP versus Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank in re TIBC L/Cs


In discussing the Fortis lawsuit against ADIB, I mentioned that ADIB was also a defendant in a lawsuit brought by BNP Paribas' "Full Commercial" Branch in the Kingdom of Bahrain.

The relevant documents can be found at the NY Supreme Court Website http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASMain  under Case # 603365/2009.   Or more precisely one document as all that is posted so far is the complaint by BNPP - missing what I'll bet ares some very interesting attachments.  Unclear why this is.  Especially since the submission in question dates from November 2009.

Here are the facts from the material posted on the NY Supreme Court's website:
  1. In March 2009, ADIB issued six irrevocable reimbursement undertakings ("IRU's") in favor of BNPP to induce it to confirm 6 "commercial" letters of credit issued by The International Banking Corporation in favor of Dawnay Day and Co for the Account of AlGosaibi Trading Company.
  2. BNPP confirmed TIBC's letters of credit and then upon presentation of the documents accepted the documents and the time drafts presented.  
  3. On an unspecified date, BNPP claimed reimbursement of some US$44,875,000 from ADIB.  Presumably, the maturity date of the accepted time drafts.
  4. ADIB refused to pay.
  5. In September 2009 (after acceptance of the drafts by BNPP) ADIB obtained a judgment in Bahrain Court enjoining ADIB from making any payment.  
  6. BNPP is seeking to have the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing ADIB from moving assets (presumably balances in its correspondent accounts in NY) from the USA.
  7. Its claim is for the principal of the payment (US$44,875,000) plus interest, attorney's fees and costs.
Now to some comments.
  1. It's not clear to me why there isn't more precision in documents sent to the Court with exact dates when events took place, additional details of the individual transactions -  currency, goods, tenor, etc.  Perhaps time was of the essence and BNPP's lawyers wanted to file quickly to block the potential movement of assets outside of the USA. 
  2. Dawnay Day was a very large "financial firm" with a commodities trading wing which ran into some "financial difficulties" as a result, I believe, of the global financial crisis (small "g" as always).  It was also an active participant in structured "Islamic" trade transactions as described in my post about Fortis.  It had at least one subsidiary Condor Trading which it uses so that the "purchaser" and "seller" of the goods are not the same party.  
  3. It appears (but the documentary record here is very slim so this is an educated guess) to be a mirror of the Fortis transaction.  The TIBC L/Cs are one half of the "Islamic" structure:  the purchase on deferred terms.  For TIBC/AlGosaibi to actually get the funds a spot sale on a cash basis is required.  That could have been with Condor with TIBC Bank acting as the "arranger" of the transaction.   That is probably the most likely scenario and the one that I think happened - but again note this is an educated (or uneducated) guess.
  4. Since discovery in other legal cases has resulted in the publication of  some details of at least the US - domiciled US dollar accounts of Awal Bank and TIBC, clever boots might be looking through that material for incoming credits around the time of the negotiation/acceptance (but not the payment date) of the first leg letters of credit. That is in the Fortis case the Awal Bank LC confirmed by Fortis under ADIB's IRU.  And in the BNPP case, the letters of credit issued by TIBC and confirmed by BNPP against ADIB's IRUs.  If these are indeed disguised clean money on money loans, the second leg (the spot sale) should have occurred around the same time.  The amounts would not necessarily be the same as interest on the loan might be built into the price on the first leg (the deferred payment).
  5. But one key additional bit of information.  If we look at the Fortis Case (NY Supreme Court Reference 601948/2009 Exhibit #2 Document #34 Amended Declaration of Qays Zubi, we note two things.  First, TIBC LC's seem to have been denominated in Euros not US.  Second, a restraining order has only been obtained for four L/Cs not six as mentioned in BNPP's complaint.  The total of the L/C's mentioned in the Qays Zubi Declaration are some Euros 18,243,975.  Clearly, that does not equal US$44,875,000.  Two L/Cs are "missing".  Does that give Fortis a legal "wedge"?
  6. We also learn that the payment dates on the TIBC L/Cs were between 22 June and 24 June.  You'll also notice that the certified translation has an error in that it shows the last LC as due March 23,2009.  The Arabic clearly states (in "Western" numbers not Arabic!!!) 23 June. 
  7. The central point of BNPP's claim (like that of Fortis) is that under a documentary (aka commercial) letter of credit the bank's obligation to pay is independent of the commercial contract.  Its obligation is set by the terms of the letter of credit.  Compliance with the documentary requirements of the letter of credit establishes the obligation.  
  8. To overcome the rather substantial amount of case law and precedents in favor of BNPP's legal position, I believe ADIB has to prove two things. (a)  Fraud in the inception.    (b) Involvement of BNPP in that fraud.  That is a a tough row to hoe as the saying goes.  

Monday 19 July 2010

AlGosaibi v Maan AlSanea - Fortis Bank versus ADIB - The Letter of Credit

See important additional information here on Bunge's role in transaction and ADIB's knowledge of the nature of the transaction.

As promised a look at the Letter of Credit ("L/C") issued by Awal Bank which Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank ("ADIB") advised and confirmed to Fortis Bank Netherlands.

The text of the L/C issued by ADIB through Fortis is Exhibit #2 to Document #24, the Declaration of Nuhaid Saliba dated 31 August 2009. Note Exhibit #1 is the text that Awal proposed to ADIB.  That of course is not the instrument on which Fortis relied and through which ADIB conveyed its irrevocable undertaking.  Exhibit #2 is the key document as ADIB is its author.

And just to be complete, as you'll recall, ADIB is asserting fraud as the basis for voiding its obligation but not fraudulent documents or fraudulent shipment or non shipment.  Most jurisdictions have held that if the documents comply with the terms of the L/C then the bank is obligated to pay.  The "fraud" defense is applicable only in very limited circumstances.  

These and other documents can be found at the NY Supreme Court Website http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASMain  under Case # 601948/2009, 

Let's step through the details of the L/C.
  1. Issue Date: 16 June 2008.
  2. Expiry Date:  14 July 2008
  3. Applicable Rules:  UCPURR = Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (#600 of 2007) and Uniform Rules for Bank-to-Bank Reimbursement under Documentary Credits (#725 of 2007).  The former sets forth the rules for the handling of L/Cs.  The latter the rules for banks to reimburse or pay one another   These are pretty much the standard governing principles for commercial letters of credit (aka "documentary credits").
  4. Issuing Bank:  Awal Bank BSC Bahrain
  5. Applicant - AlGosaibi Trading Services Hamilton Bermuda
  6. Beneficiary - Bunge SA Switzerland
  7. Currency/Amount:  US$39.999,996.52
  8. Payment:  360 Days after acceptance of documents.
  9. Port Loading:  Any port in Brazil.
  10. Final Destination: Any port in Taiwan and/or Spain.
  11. Latest Date of Shipment:  30 June 2008.
  12. Goods Description:  (a) 52,686.31 MTS of Brazilian soybeans, packing in bulk at US$564.90 Per MT CFR Taiwan (b) 30,000.00 MTS of Brazilian maize SLM packing in bulk at US$341.25 per MT CFR Spain.  (Note: CFR = Cost and Freight)
  13. Documents Required:  (a) One copy of commercial invoice.  (b) One photocopy of the bill of lading. (c) One copy of beneficiary's certificate stating that the copies of shipping documents provided are true and correct copies of the originals.  That the original bills of lading relating to the shipment should be sent to the Notify Party stated in the B/Ls or to the agent at destination and that the goods described should be discharged at the port state in the B/Ls.
Additional Conditions:
  1. Third party documents except drafts and invoices acceptable.
  2. Documents showing one or more third party (ies) as shipper and/or exporter are acceptable.
  3. Fax or photocopy of documents are acceptable.  Documents issued before LC issuance (including B/L) are acceptable.
  4. Documents acceptable inspite of any and all discrepancies with exception that invoice value drawn may not exceed the maximum letter of credit value and the letter of credit may not be expired.
  5. Typing mistakes do not constitute a discrepancies.
  6. Late presentation of documents is accepted on the condition that documents are presented within LC validity.
  7. Bill of lading presenting a greater quantity/amount than shown on invoice is acceptable.
  8. Documents shall be acceptable as presented.
  9. Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank Abu Dhabi UAE is authorise to confirm this L/C and advise it to Fortis Bank Rotterdam.
  10. Fortis Bank Rotterdam is authorised to confirm this L/C at the request and for the account of the beneficiary.  The confirmation of the first advising bank, that is Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Abu Dhabi UAE covers the obligation of the issuing bank, that is Awal Bank BSC, Manama and the confirmation of the Fortis Bank (Nederland) NV Rotterdam only covers the obligations of the first advising bank, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Abu Dhabi UAE.
  11. Charges:  ADIB's confirmation charge (a cool US$500,000) for Awal.  Fortis' charge (not specified here) for Bunge.
Now to the tafsir.

First, as is pretty clear from the text of the L/C this is not a typical documentary letter of credit.  It is closer to a standby letter of credit - which you can think of as a guarantee of payment.
  1. At no time do any of the banks involved have an original bill of lading in their possession.  An original bill of lading is generally required by a shipping company to release goods it has shipped.    Having the B/L provides a measure of collateral security, if the applicant does not pay.  Now in a transaction in which the bank is giving its obligation to pay the beneficiary in the future (in this case 360 days after it accepts the documents) having the B/L only provides collateral comfort for a short period while it is at risk for the applicant or issuing bank's failure to pay.
  2. In Additional Conditions #4, the issuing bank has explicitly waived all and any discrepancies in the documents except for the amount drawn under the credit and presentation within the L/C validity.  That means any other condition.  Hardly the stance that a party concerned with the underlying commercial transaction would take.  The power to refuse payment for discrepancies (in the documents) provides a way to enforce the terms of the contract on the seller. Giving this right up doesn't make a lot of commercial sense.
  3. In Additional Conditions #7, B/Ls showing a larger quantity are acceptable.  Under UCP 600, for bulk commodities, a variation of +/- 5% is allowed (Article 30 (b)) unless prohibited.  5% of the amount shipped would be roughly US$2 million.  Would all of you out there who think that Bunge is going to ship another US$2 million worth of crops but not get paid for them, please raise your hands?  Didn't think I'd see any.  Of course there is no harm in this clause as it benefits the applicant.   But what is the commercial reason this would be included?  
  4. A couple other conditions are worthy of mention.  As noted above, Additional Condition #1  allows third parties on the shipping documents.  Meaning the shipper need not be Bunge and the party receiving the goods need not be AlGosaibi.   Additional Condition #3 allows documents to be dated prior to the L/C issuance. Faxes of documents are acceptable.  Coupled with the earlier waiver of  all discrepancies except for payment amount and presentation within L/C validity, all this looks like setting up the conditions for document shopping.  That is, making it very very easy to find conforming documents from another trade transaction not involving the parties named in the L/C.  All one needs is access to documents and a photocopier.
Second, is there a commercial reason for such a structure?  Possibly but how likely?
  1. The above conditions would be useful if both parties were engaged in rapid turnover trading.  Bunge strikes a deal with ATS at price X but finds another seller willing to sell at less than X.  Being able to substitute sellers/shippers allows Bunge to make an additional profit by buying the goods from this other party and delivering to ATS.  This condition allows ATS to sell the goods  to a third party, Buyer B, before it has taken possession by switching the delivery party.
  2. But waiving the right to refuse to pay for any discrepancies could be problematical if ATS has on sold the goods as described to new Buyer B.   One would think Buyer B would have stipulated certain quantity and type of goods and reserve the right to refuse payments if these and other conditions that it required were not met.  Now perhaps Buyer B has waived these.  But what are the chances?  The goods are the commercial heart of the transaction.
  3. On that score it might be more typical to see an inspection certificate (of the goods) particularly since a third party shipper might not be as reliable as Bunge. 
  4. Now it's not unheard of that cargoes already at sea are sold (remember that documents issued prior to the L/C issuance date are acceptable).  But at that point, one should know the exact quantity of the goods and the identity of the parties.  And this could be incorporated into the L/C.  Now, I suppose the transaction could be taking place so quickly that speed was of the essence - a split second response required.  However, the documents submitted in the case indicate that ADIB cogitated for a while (though perhaps not long enough) before agreeing to the transaction.  And then it appears the transaction amount was increased after it had given an approval for a lower amount.  And so it had an opportunity like Proud Edward "tae think again".  Though to be fair, ADIB seems like Proud Edward to have thought again after "24 June" and not before.
  5. Generally, transactions of this sort would be secured (from the intermediary buyer's perspective -- here ATS) by use of a transferable letter of credit (opened by the final buyer Buyer B in favor of ATS).  Or through a "back to back" L/C which is a particular favorite among many MENA banks though it is technically less sound from a protection perspective, including for the issuing/confirming banks of the second or "back to back" L/C.
Third, so what could be another reason for this structure?   To provide Awal and/or ATS financing.  But this requires a few bits more in the structure.
  1. This L/C provides for a payment to Bunge 360 days from documentary acceptance.  At this point there has been no movement of funds.  Now it's not uncommon in such situations for the seller (Bunge in this case) to ask the confirming bank (Fortis) to make an immediate payment.  The bank would "buy" (discount) the acceptance for an amount less than its face value.  You can think of the difference as interest.  This could get the money to Bunge, though strictly speaking that's not necessary to get funding to ATS/Awal.  
  2. If you reflect on the typical "Islamic" "trade" financing described above, you'll see that the ADIB L/C is the equivalent of the purchase of the goods on deferred payment basis.
  3. Getting the funds to Awal/ATS requires the other half of the "Islamic" "trade" financing structure: the offsetting transaction the sale of the goods for spot settlement.  Such as sale could be either back to Bunge.  Or to a third party.  This may be a reason why ADIB's lawyers are pushing for further disclosure by Fortis to see if they are involved in this critical leg.
  4. Just to close the Bunge circle.  The usual "Islamic" "trade" finance transaction keeps the deal "all in the family" so it's not inconceivable that they might have been involved.  If Bunge were involved, one would presume that it discounted the Fortis payment to use as the purchase price back from ATS/Awal - of course with a suitable commission for its trouble.   Note:  This is hypothetical.  I have no knowledge of Bunge being involved in the second leg. This discussion provides an illustration of how the transaction may have been structured.  Not that it was so structured.
  5. Presumably, ATS did not hang on to the commodities with the intent of selling a year later.  Equally, it's unlikely that ATS has a "factory" in which to process the goods.  So the likely disposition of the goods is a sale.  If the goods were sold on a spot basis, then ATS/Awal have a one year loan due when the Fortis acceptance "matures" - irrespective whether Fortis has or has not discounted that obligation.
  6. It's well known out there that commodity companies and brokers (including the one named in the TIBC  BNPP / ADIB legal dispute) specialize in providing "trade documents" for "Islamic" "trade" transactions that are really disguised financings.  Because Shari'ah Boards have become a bit more alert, many of these parties have established special purpose subsidiaries with completely different names so the buyers and sellers appear to be unrelated parties.   And have made presentations to  banks who wish to engage in "Islamic" "trade" transactions (or loans if you'd prefer) on how they  can help.
  7. How does this work?  The financing bank arranges to acquire goods from Company A (Let's call it Dewey Night Company).  It then sells them to the Buyer (borrower if you will) on a deferred payment basis (the tenor of the loan) at original cost plus a mark-up.  At the same time it offers to sell the goods spot for the Buyer (borrower) to another company (Let's call that one "Eagle" Trading Company).  Usually the Murabaha contract (for this is a Murabaha trade transaction not a loan!) specifies that the spot sale cannot be for less than the original cost. The helpful commodity firm or broker provides all the required documents for the two sales   The mark-up miraculously just happens to equate to the interest on the loan.  Proving that in some forms of "Islam" miracles are indeed common. The commodity company makes a fee for its role - just as the innkeeper makes a profit for renting you a room for a night.  Documents are available for the Shari'ah Board to review if it wants.  These on their face document a trade transaction.  It seems everyone is happy.  و الله اعلم
  8. And if you'd like to place a deposit with a bank, you can do the reverse transaction.
Fourth, how does this transaction differ from a typical "Islamic" "trade" transaction?
  1. The ultimate financing bank in the transaction is ADIB.  While it is true that it does not advance funds, it is ultimately on the hook if Awal does not pay.  Under its confirmation it is obligated to pay Fortis if Fortis claims within the validity of the L/C and complies with the miniscule conditions provided.
  2. For this transaction it only requires half of the set of documents.  A bit less financial engineering.
  3. More importantly what is in effect a guarantee or a standby L/C is treated as a commercial L/C with a lower capital charge under Basel II.  Thus, ADIB's risk adjusted ROE/ROA is higher.  And more importantly, its CAR is higher.
Fifth, how credible is ADIB's sudden charge that something was wrong with the transaction?  That there was potential for fraud.
  1. First, to accept ADIB's contention, one has to begin by assuming that ADIB has a very limited understanding of letters of credit and UCP600.  Or that the L/C Department personnel assigned to this transaction were incompetent.
  2. Second, one also has to assume that ADIB is rather new to structured transactions.  However, since AA has seen ADIB's "Islamic" "trade" documentation of various flavors, at least for AA accepting that is more than a "bit of a stretch".
  3. Third, the documents submitted by lawyers in this case indicate what would appear to be scrutiny of the transaction by ADIB's credit department.  If this transaction "slipped by" and wasn't recognized as a "structured" transaction - a payment guarantee and not a trade transaction - then one has to draw some rather unfortunate conclusions about credit analysis and risk management at that bank.
  4. Rather what seems to have happened is that ADIB decided for about 500,000 good reasons (the US$ equivalent of the confirmation commission it received from Awal) to go forward with a structured transaction.   One that had some CAR advantages.  
  5. Now that Awal has hit the wall, in what sadly seems to be a tradition of some "Islamic" banks (paging TID in re BLOM)  it's looking for a legal way out. (Paging Abu Yusuf).  At least in this case, it doesn't appear they're resorting to spurious arguments regarding the Shari'ah.
  6. Finally most of what is labeled "Islamic" "trade" finance  is structured with manufactured transactions   All the parties (save perhaps for the Shari'ah Boards) know that these transactions are structured.   That they are really money on money loans, dressed up in thaubs and ghutras to disguise the reality.  For ADIB to suddenly claim ignorance of this is well beyond the plausible. 
A bit later I'll post some more comments on this case.  In the interim, you can look at the NY Supreme Court website.  Documents #78 and #79 contain letters by the two sides recapping the main points of their arguments.

Sunday 18 July 2010

Aabar: UAE Securities and Commodities Authority Orders AED1.95 Tender Price

The UAE SCA ordered IPIC to raise its tender price to AED1.95 per share based on the average of the past six months' trading.

It also set the Offer Period from 20 July through 5 August with payment to all tendering shareholders no later than 10 August 2010.

I must confess that I hadn't expected the SCA to upset the original price.  And for the small percentage I assigned to that event, certainly not as dramatic an increase in price as this.  The SCA may show only one eye in its logo, but it apparently has keen sight and a strong will - even when faced with "important" parties on the other end.   Hopefully, a trend that will continue.

Tuesday 13 July 2010

Aabar Takeover - The Wall St WTF "Take"

Ken has a good post on Aabar's take-over offer over at his blog.  Worth a read.

Monday 5 July 2010

More Signs of Real Estate Woes in the UAE



According to Bradley Hope at The National, Sorouh Real Estate has introduced a "rent-to-buy" scheme for commercial tenants at its Sky Tower on Reem Island.  The plan is apparently designed to "fill out" the remaining 20,000 square meters of commercial space.  Previously, Sorouh had offered a below market rate of 4.99% to first time buyers at its Sky and Sun Towers in the Shams Gate project on Reem.




This follows the announcement earlier this week that Dubai had given Nakheel's Board control over Limitless.    I suspect this is the first step towards combining the two companies as a way of reducing costs as well as adjusting capacity to realistic prospects for demand.

As you'll notice from this article also from The National, Limitless' problems were caused by the "global" (financial) crisis.   On a personal note, I was gratified to see that TN did not use the term "Global Financial crisis" using the SAM stylebook with all lower case letters.  There are some sensitive folks up North as AA knows only too well.

Wednesday 12 May 2010

Shaykh Sultan Bin Khalifa - Let's Make A Deal?

A very interesting post over at Rupert Bumfrey's blog.

Here's another link to the story at Moscow Times.

And an earlier one to the Times of London.

Let's see if more emerges.  Right now the story is a bit hard to swallow.

As far as I can tell this is still on the level of an accusation by one party in a rather bitter dispute with another.

Tuesday 4 May 2010

New UAE Corporate Governance Code - Effective 30 April 2010

Below are the texts of the "new" corporate governance code.


Arabic language - which is the governing text.

English language - for convenience.

Thursday 29 April 2010

Tabreed Announces "Postponement" of Extraordinary General Meeting Due to Lack of Quorum


Tabreed announced on the Dubai Stock Exchange that its recent attempt 28 April (the second one) to hold an EGM failed due to a lack of a quorum.  Next meeting will be held 5 May.

Third time lucky?

Tuesday 27 April 2010

Tabreed Announces Deferrment of 19 May Payment on its 2008 Sukuk



In connection with its 1Q10 earnings release, Tabreed announced:
Following a review of alternatives with respect to the annual distribution on its convertible Ijara 08 Sukuk, Tabreed intends to defer making this payment on May 19th. Deferring the annual distribution is consistent with the objectives of the recapitalization proposal that will be decided upon by Tabreed’s shareholders and reflects the subordinated and equity-like nature of the 08 Sukuk.  Mubadala Development Company and ACWA Holdings, who together represent a majority of 08 Sukuk holders, have expressed their support for Tabreed’s decision.  Tabreed intends to propose amendments to the terms of the 08 Sukuk in due course in connection with its broader recapitalization program that Tabreed is targeting for completion in Q4 2010.
This is yet another sign of the "knock-on" effect from the slowdown in the construction/real estate sector in the UAE.  Also note that a significant portion of 1Q10 earnings are non cash items related to the Sukuk.

The Real Nick on The Real Estate Sector in Dubai

A comment from The Real Nick to one of my posts that deserves a bit more prominent place here at this blog.

And considering my last few posts, perhaps a new feature here at SAM - informed commentary.

TRN's commentary is immediately below.

The fear of losing face seems to be stronger than reason (nothing new there..). There is no way Nakheel can resurrect the 'vision'. Even if the guy who "wrote [a poem] on water" around Palm Jebel Ali continues to wish it...It's over, and out.

The consolidation may not look brutal to you, from a distance. Here on the dusty ground, it looks scary: Thousands in the real estate and construction have lost their jobs and continue to lose. Contractors have stamina. They'll not shut up shop at the first hiccup but should be able to sustain one or two years without work. Many have done that, but the two years are over now and Abu Dhabi for one hasn't pulled the finger out. Watching AD make decisions is like watching paint dry. Only less fun.
And one has to remember that this industry accounted for way more than 30% of Dubai's economy. My boss, who's been around the Dubai construction /development business for thirty odd years, reckons that we are staring into an abyss of seven to ten lean years (supermodel style lean; anorexic style lean).
You can make this up on your fingers: Add the tidal wave of oversupply which is about to break on our real estate shores and swamp if for years, and the pre-contract (pre-construction) timeline of any new substantial projects of two/three years and then a construction period of three years. I.e to do big things you need 5/6 years and you'd be a fool do start even thinking about anything before 2012/2013 /2014...

Nakheel, khallas!